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Abstract
Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may ne-
gotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desir-
ability of bundling when values are common and/or information endogenous. The
paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby
facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security
design.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies “liquidity” (here defined as the volume of rational trade) in environ-
ments in which buyers and sellers may exchange goods either piecemeal or bundled. The
private and social desirability of bundling, or conversely tranching, hinges on whether it
facilitates or hinders trade, and has two facets: a) does bundling facilitate trade for given
information structures; and b) does bundling incentivize information structures that are
conducive to trade? While we shed light on a), our main contribution concerns b): we
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show that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating
trade, hence the title of the paper.
Section 2 develops the following canonical model. A good or asset has value sδ+ S
to the seller and bδ+ B to the buyer, where δ = 1 (high-quality) or 0 (lemon) and S ≤ B
and s ≤ b (gains from trade). The seller and the buyer can privately learn δ at a cost (that
may differ between the two parties). They then bargain. Equilibrium liquidity depends
on information acquisition costs and on the parties’ bargaining powers. An asymme-
try of information about the quality of the good/asset creates a suboptimal volume of
trade. Bundling implies that the bundle is sold wholesale, while tranching/piecemeal
negotiations consist in negotiating separately over the safe (δ-insensitive) and the risky
(δ-sensitive) parts.
“Common value” environments with bundling/tranching decisions abound:
• Structured finance : our lead example concerns the choice of whether to pool or
tranche securities, say in safe debt and risky equity components.
• Industrial organization : common values arise when a higher quality is associated
with a higher cost for the manufacturer or when parties enjoy resale options. Risk
shifting through warranties, return options or additional coverage in insurance con-
tracts may be tied to, or obtained separately from the acquisition of the basic prod-
uct.
• Compensation design : An employer and an employee may negotiate over a fixed
wage and a performance-based bonus, or directly over both. Common values arise
from the employer’ ability to know more about the profitability of the task and the
employee’s knowledge of his talent or capability in the task.
• Politics : Legislators have found that combining separate measures into one large
bill, called an omnibus bill, often enhances the odds for passage but can also lead to
a complete breakdown of legislative action.
• International negotiations : Opinions diverge as to whether climate change negoti-
ations should be conducted at the sectoral level or globally. Piecemeal negotiations
(the equivalent of tranching) affect incentives for information acquisition as well as
incentives for lobbies to build up resistance to an agreement.
• Banking regulation : Separation between investment and retail banking (Glass-Steagall
Act, Volker and Vickers rules)1 is akin to the tranching of a universal bank into a
1We are grateful to Elu van Thadden for this suggestion.
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relatively low-information-intensity entity (the retail bank) and a high-information-
intensity entity (the investment bank). Buyers of claims on the bank (retail deposi-
tors – i.e. the banking regulator/taxpayers –, wholesale depositors, etc.) face differ-
ent incentives to collect information in the two arrangements, an issue that has been
overlooked in the policy discussions on the matter.
• Project financing : Public authorities may negotiate the construction and manage-
ment & maintenance contracts separately (and usually sequentially); or the two may
be bundled as in public-private partnerships.
Section 3 takes the information structure as given (like much of the literature), and
unveils two conflicting effects of tranching. On the one hand, tranching protects the safe
component from the risk of illiquidity. This insulation effect has attracted much attention
in the finance literature (since Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)). On the other hand, the
absence of bundled safe component in the risky component reduces the cost of not trading
the risky part and thereby makes the trading of the risky part less likely: the bundling of
the safe part is a trading adjuvant for the transfer of the risky part. The overall impact
of these insulation and trading adjuvant effects depends on the liquidity of the bundle: if
the bundle is liquid, then tranching can only hinder the transfer of value between parties.
By contrast, if the bundle is illiquid, tranching increases liquidity by ensuring that the
debt component is transferred.
Endogenizing the information structure, Section 4 argues that spinning off the safe
component increases the incentive to acquire information when information is to be de-
terred (because one party finds it too expensive to acquire information) and reduces this
incentive when information acquisition is to be encouraged (so to re-establish the sym-
metry of information). It thereby identifies an important cost of tranching.
The thrust of the argument goes as follows: Consider a situation in which both par-
ties remain ignorant and so gains from trade are fully realized. One party’s temptation
to become informed is associated with the option not to trade. The seller would like to
identify a gem so as to keep it and sell only if the good/asset has mediocre quality; like-
wise, the buyer aspires at identifying a lemon so as to refrain from acquiring it. Deterring
information acquisition thus requires making the absence of trade costly. Spinning off the
safe component reduces the cost of not trading the risky (information intensive) part; it
thereby encourages information acquisition and may reduce the overall liquidity.2
2This mechanism is reminiscent of Whinston (1990)’s argument that bundling a monopoly good with
a competitive one makes it more costly for a seller not to sell the competitive one and so increases his
volume of sales in the competitive market. Whinston’s application and focus - entry deterrence – are rather
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By contrast, when one party is informed, the incentive of the other party to become
informed is associated with an increase in the probability of trading as symmetric in-
formation delivers efficient trade. And bundling increases the cost of not trading. The
literature has mostly considered situations in which at most one party to the potential
trade is informed. When both sides can acquire information, ignorance may no longer be
desirable. Indeed, liquidity stems not from the lack of information, but more generally
from the commonality of information. And so if one party is likely to be informed, it is
desirable to encourage information acquisition by the other party so as to reestablish the
symmetry of information and thereby restore liquidity.
To highlight the adverse social impact of tranching on information acquisition, we
then restrict attention to parameter values such that the insulation effect dominates the
trading adjuvant effect, and so tranching is a superior alternative when parties are exoge-
nously asymmetrically informed (tranching is obviously liquidity-neutral under symmet-
ric information). Even in this most favorable case for tranching, tranching may become
undesirable once information acquisition is endogenized.
To drive home the point that tranching works again the commonality of information,
we also use a simple convexity argument to show that if commonality of information
prevails when a security is tranched into n arbitrary securities, then it prevails a fortiori
when the security is not tranched.
Section 5 concludes with some alleys for future research.
Related literature. Most of the existing literature is couched in the context of structured
finance. Financial institutions and corporations need to store value to meet cash shortages
and take advantage of acquisition and investment opportunities. The attractiveness of an
asset as a store of value hinges on its liquidity – its owner’s ability to rapidly part with the
asset at a fair price. Liquidity in turn requires buyers not to cherry pick high-quality assets
and sellers not to trade only their lemons. As the recent crisis and other episodes suggest,
suspicions about asset quality may have serious consequences for the functioning of the
economy.
Starting with Akerlof (1970), economists have investigated the impact of information
held by either sellers or buyers on the volume of trade and efficiency. It has been estab-
lished that informed sellers have an incentive to engage in limited securitization/resale
in order to signal asset quality (Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984)) and
unrelated with the current paper, though.
Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) point out that pooling different assets, each
with its own underlying information, reduces asymmetries of information (by the law of large numbers)
and therefore boosts liquidity. Their insight is unrelated to the one just developed, as we consider a single
asset, which can be tranched or sold as is.
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that security design prior to seller information acquisition may reduce signaling costs
(DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), DeMarzo (2005), Plantin (2009)). Sellers’ ability to part
with their assets at fair prices is also hindered when buyers have private information,
the focus of much market micro-structure economics; in this spirit, Gorton and Pennac-
chi (1990) recommend the use of tranching to create low-information-intensity (debt-like)
securities that protect sellers from the “seller’s curse”, namely the risk of selling only
high-quality assets when trading with an informed buyer.3 Thus, low-information in-
tensity (LII)/debt-like securities mitigate adverse selection (held by an informed seller in
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and an informed buyer in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).4
An important recent strand of this literature, initiated by Dang et al (2011), notes that
information structures are endogenous and so argues that securities, to be liquid, should
be designed with an eye on their impact on information acquisition.5 Dang et al. show
that debt contracts optimally deter buyer information acquisition and may thereby maxi-
mize seller welfare. Two central and recurring insights of the literature are:
• Tranching is optimal. The creation of debt-like securities alleviates buyer concerns
about the seller’s ability to foist a lemon, and seller concerns about the seller’s curse.
It further minimizes incentives for information acquisition. Tranching thus boosts
liquidity, the value of assets and welfare.
• Ignorance is bliss. The acquisition of information by the potentially informed party
is to be deterred or at least limited.
Our paper revisits and qualifies these conclusions in several ways that will be dis-
cussed in more detail in section 4.3. Besides the fact that we allow two-sided information
3See also Hennessy (2012), who further endogenizes the speculator’s information acquisition.
In Lester et al (2012) agents are either fully knowledgeable about the asset that can be used to trade
goods; or they cannot even recognize a counterfeit (and their counterparty knows that). Then trade can only
occur between cognoscenti. “Money” then refers to assets which many agents in the economy are familiar
with. In a closely related contribution, Banerjee and Maskin (1996) assume agents can trade only what they
recognize. Goods come in two qualities, high and low. Gresham’s law is derived from the lemons’ model:
only low-quality goods are candidates to be used as media of exchange and only low-quality goods are
properly priced. In general, only one good (roughly that subject to the least adverse selection) emerges as a
means of exchange.
4Biais and Mariotti (2005) shows that debt protects not only against adverse selection, but also against
monopsony power. In their paper, the issuer receives a signal for the underlying asset’s final payoff realiza-
tion after the security design stage, but before trading takes place. The buyer offers a schedule specifying
a transfer T(q) for arbitrary fractions q in [0, 1] of the security. For example, when the signal is the future
payoff realization, a debt claim has the same value for all realizations beyond the nominal debt claim; this
creates an elastic demand curve and limits the buyer’s market power.
5See Yang (2011) for a neat extension of the Dang et al framework, and Crémer and Khalil (1992) for an
early paper on optimal mechanism design with endogenous information acquisition by the agent.
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acquisition, thereby generalizing the second insight to “Commonality of information is
bliss”, we also assume that the seller cannot commit not to sell the risky component af-
ter having sold the safe one, thereby limiting the seller’s ability to reduce incentives for
information acquisition by limiting the volume of issuance. We are agnostic as to which
of the two polar cases, that of the security design literature and our no-commitment as-
sumption, is more realistic. For example, under limited seller liquidity needs, for which
selling the safe component suffices, the commitment assumption is rather reasonable; by
contrast for higher liquidity needs, it will be hard for the seller to commit not to bring the
risky part to the market as well.
Our paper is also related to the literature on bargaining under endogenously asym-
metric information. Like Dang et al (2011) and Yang (2011), this literature is preoccupied
mainly with information acquisition deterrence, albeit in simpler games of bargaining
with take-it-or-leave-it offers for the bundle (there is no security design). Shavell (1994)
studies the voluntary and mandatory disclosure of hard, private-value information in a
trading relationship between a seller and a buyer; he shows for instance that the seller has
excessive incentives to acquire information about the buyer’s valuation whether this in-
formation is socially useful or not, and that disclosure should be mandated. Dang (2008),
in a common-value environment, points out that no trade and no information acquisition
may simultaneously arise in equilibrium, and also shows that, in contrast with conven-
tional wisdom, a party receiving the offer may obtain up to the full social surplus of the
transaction when the offer is tailored to discourage him from acquiring information. Be-
sides some modeling differences (in particular, we assume that parties decide whether to
acquire their information before bargaining, so offers cannot by themselves deter infor-
mation acquisition), these papers again have a different focus and do not address the two
main themes of our paper, tranching and repeated trading.
Finally, there is a large, industrial organization literature on the impact of bundling in a
context of asymmetric, exogenous information (the buyer knows his preferences) and the
seller has full bargaining power: see e.g. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) and Armstrong
(2013) for recent contributions and the references therein. In contrast with our paper,
that literature assumes private values as well as exogenous, one-sided information; in a
nutshell, the buyer knows his preferences and the seller price discriminates. This simpler
framework allows the literature to consider much more general demand functions than
that studied here.
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2 Model
Consider a meeting between a seller and a buyer. The seller is endowed with an asset
(we will use the terminology of our lead example). He can sell this asset to the buyer. The
surplus from owning the asset for the seller and the buyer are given by respectively sδ+ S
and bδ+ B, where δ = 1 with probability ρ and δ = 0 with probability 1− ρ. Both the
buyer and the seller are risk neutral. We make the following assumption, which ensures
that there are gains from trade.
Assumption 1. (Gains from Trade). b ≥ s and B ≥ S.
We assume that δ is initially unknown to both the buyer and the seller. The seller and
the buyer can learn δ at a cost cS and cB respectively. One party cannot observe whether
the other party is informed or not.
Bargaining takes place as follows. With probability αS, the seller makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, and with the complementary probability αB = 1− αS, the buyer makes a
take-it-or-leave-it-offer. Hence we can take αS (αB) to represent the bargaining power of
the seller (buyer).
The timing is described in Figure 1. First, parties decide whether or not to become
informed. Then nature determines who gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Finally the
offer is made and is either accepted or rejected, and payoffs are realized.
Information
acquisition stage
Buyer and seller
(secretly) decide
whether to become
informed
Bargaining stage
With probability αi,
party i sets price
Party j
accepts/rejects
Figure 1: Timing
Equilibrium concept. Our equilibrium concept is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE). We will often be confronted with a situation of bargaining under asymmetric
information—both on the equilibrium path, and also off the equilibrium path when we
consider the incentives of parties to acquire information. When an uninformed party
makes an offer to an informed party, the uninformed party just sets its monopoly price,
and the informed party either accepts or rejects the offer. Things are more complex when
an informed party makes an offer to an uninformed party. The reason is that the offer
potentially conveys information and acts as a signaling mechanism. This typically leads
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to multiple PBEs. We will always select the trade maximizing equilibrium. Imagine for
example that the informed party is the seller, and the uninformed party the buyer. Then
in the trade maximizing equilibrium, the seller sets a price and sells the asset only if δ
is below a cutoff (0 or 1). The price is such that the buyer is indifferent between buying
and not buying the asset, knowing that the asset is offered to him only if δ is below the
cutoff. We can always construct beliefs such that this outcome is a PBE. It is the PBE that
maximizes both the probability of trade and the welfare of the party making the offer.
In the paper, we will use the following wording convention. With a slight abuse,
we will say that no offer is made when an offer is made but this offer is rejected with
probability 1. This convention obviously has no material impact on our analysis.
Alternative assumptions on the liquidity of the bundle.
To conform to the literature, we will first assume that the bundle is illiquid when the
two parties are asymmetrically informed. This assumption in turn decomposes into two
conditions (conditions (1) and (2) below), depending on who has the bargaining power.
Assumption 2. (Illiquid Bundle)
Inefficient Trade when Only S is Informed.
s + S > bρ+ B. (1)
Inefficient Trade when Only B is Informed.
sρ+ S > B. (2)
The left-hand side of (1) represents an informed seller’s reservation value when δ =
1. The right-hand side represents the most that an uninformed buyer is willing to pay.
Similarly, the left-hand side of (2) represents the reservation value of an uninformed seller.
The right-hand side represents an informed buyer’s willingness to pay when δ = 0.
To understand the role of these assumptions, it is necessary to anticipate the nature of
the several types of equilibria that can arise in our model. There are equilibria with asym-
metric information where only one party is informed. When only the seller is informed,
we refer to the equilibrium as an (Only S) equilibrium. Similarly, when only the buyer
is informed, we call the equilibrium (Only B). There are also equilibria with symmetric
information. When both parties are informed, we call the equilibrium (I). When no party
is informed, we call the equilibrium (NI).
Together with Assumption 1, Assumption 2 is sufficient for the equilibria with asym-
metric information (Only S) and (Only B) to feature less than full trade—this is to be
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compared with equilibria with no or full information, where trade always occurs.6
We will contrast the results in the illiquid-bundle case with those obtained when the
bundle is liquid. So let us state the “opposite” assumption:
Assumption 2’. (Liquid Bundle)
Efficient Trade when Only S is Informed:
bρ+ B− (s + S) > (1− ρ)(B− S). (3)
Efficient Trade when Only B is Informed:
B > ρ(b + B) + (1− ρ)S. (4)
Note that conditions (3) and (4) are not the exact counterparts of conditions (1) and (2),
respectively; they are mutually inconsistent, but do not cover the entire parameter space
together. The reason for this is that, for expositional convenience, we want illiquidity or
liquidity to be unambiguous, i.e. to hold regardless of whether the seller or the buyer
has the bargaining power. For instance, a necessary and sufficient condition for (Only
S) to feature less than full trade if the seller makes the offer is condition (1); a necessary
and sufficient condition for (Only S) to feature full trade if the buyer makes the offer
is condition (3). As confirmed by the comparisons between (1) and (3) and (2) and (4),
respectively, it is in general easier to obtain full trade when the informed party makes the
offer (s/he can then estimate precisely what the uninformed party is willing to accept)
than when the uninformed party makes the offer. Hence, to avoid any ambiguity as to
the (il)liquidity of the bundle, we restrict attention to the two parameter regions defined
by {(1), (2)} and {(3), (4)}, respectively.
2.1 Equilibrium information structures when the bundle is illiquid
We derive conditions on the costs of acquiring information
(
cS, cB
)
for potential pure-
strategy equilibria to exist assuming that the bundle is illiquid (Condition (1)); the anal-
ysis under Assumption 2’ is similar, and we will later derive only the relevant properties
(see Proposition 8 below).
6They are also necessary and sufficient so that in (NI), a party who secretly becomes informed will trade
less. They imply that in (I), a party who secretly becomes uninformed sets a monopoly price that features
less than full trade. Similarly, they imply that in an equilibrium where only one party is informed (Only
S or Only B), if the uninformed party makes the offer, it sets a monopoly price that features less than full
trade. Finally, the conditions are also necessary and sufficient so that in an equilibrium where only one
party is informed (Only S or Only B), if the informed party decides to secretly become uninformed, then
there is no trade.
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For each candidate equilibrium, we describe the equilibrium strategies, The reader
can look at one equilibrium (e.g., (NI)) derivation and move directly to Figure 2, which
summarizes the four possibilities.
2.1.1 Non-Informed equilibrium (NI)
Equilibrium. We first characterize equilibria where neither the seller nor the buyer are
informed. If the seller makes the offer, he sets a price equal to bρ+ B. If the buyer makes
the offer, he sets a price equal to sρ+ S. Trade always occurs. The party making the offer
appropriates all the trade surplus (bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S). The payoffs to the seller and the
buyer are
vS = αS [bρ+ B] + αB [sρ+ S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αB [(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)] .
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire infor-
mation. Suppose that the seller becomes informed. If the seller makes the offer, then he
does not sell the asset if δ = 1, and sells the asset at price bρ+ B if δ = 0. The fact that
the seller prefers not to sell at price bρ+ B if δ = 1 is a direct consequence of Condition
(1). To check that this outcome maximizes trade given the information structure, suppose
that the seller makes an offer different from bρ+ B, generating off-the-equilibrium path
beliefs ρˆ > ρ (if ρˆ ≤ ρ, the seller doesn’t benefit from offering an unexpected price). The
seller trades the high-quality asset only if bρˆ+ B ≥ s + S, but then the value to the buyer
is only bρ+ B, leading to a rejection. Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. The
seller accepts the offer and sells the asset if δ = 0 and keeps the asset if δ = 1. As a result,
the condition that the seller does not acquire information is
cS ≥ αBρ [(s + S)− (sρ+ S)] + αSρ [(s + S)− (bρ+ B)] .
Similarly, using Condition (2) the condition that the buyer does not acquire information
is
cB ≥ αB (1− ρ) [sρ+ S− B] + αS (1− ρ) [bρ+ B− B] .
Define
cS ≡ αBρ (1− ρ) s + αSρ [(s + S)− (bρ+ B)] ,
cB ≡ αB (1− ρ) [sρ+ S− B] + αSρ (1− ρ) b.
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We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (NI). When the bundle is illiquid (Assumption 2), the Non-Informed (NI) equi-
librium exists if and only if cS ≥ cS and cB ≥ cB.
The incentives to become informed in the (NI) equilibrium derive solely from the pos-
sibility of refusing disadvantageous trades, whether or not the party who becomes in-
formed makes the offer. Importantly, the incentives to become informed do not arise
from an ability to charge different prices when trade does occur. For example, if the seller
becomes informed, he chooses not to sell when δ = 1 whether or not he makes the offer.
2.1.2 Informed equilibrium (I)
Equilibrium. Here we characterize the equilibrium where both the seller and the buyer
are informed. If the seller makes the offer, he sets a price equal to bδ + B. If the buyer
makes the offer, he sets a price equal to sδ+ S. Trade always occurs. The payoffs to the
seller and the buyer are the same as in (NI) minus the information acquisition costs:
vS = αS [bρ+ B] + αB [sρ+ S]− cS,
vB = αS [0] + αB [(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)]− cB.
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire in-
formation. Suppose that the seller decides not to become informed. Suppose first that
the seller makes the offer. Provided that ρ (b + B) + (1− ρ) S ≥ B, which is implied by
Condition (2), the seller sets a price equal to b + B (rather than B), so that the buyer buys
the asset if δ = 1 and not if δ = 0. Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. Then
the buyer’s offer reveals δ, and the seller always accepts the buyer’s offer. Hence the
condition that the seller becomes informed can be written as
cS ≤ αS [(bρ+ B)− ρ (b + B)− (1− ρ) S] .
Similarly, provided that (1− ρ) [B− S] ≥ bρ+ B− (s + S), which is implied by Condition
(1), the condition that the buyer becomes informed can be written as
cB ≤ αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] .
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Define
c¯S ≡ αS (1− ρ) [B− S] ,
c¯B ≡ αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] .
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (I). When the bundle is illiquid (Assumption 2), the Informed (I) equilibrium
exists if and only if cS ≤ c¯S and cB ≤ c¯B.
The incentives to become informed for a party in the (I) equilibrium come from the
possibility to perfectly price discriminate the other party when making the offer. If instead
the party under consideration does not become informed, he has to revert in this case to
imperfect price discrimination. He thus extracts less surplus and trades less if it does not
become informed.
2.1.3 Only S Informed equilibrium (Only S)
Equilibrium. Here we characterize the equilibrium where the seller is informed but the
buyer is not. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to B and sells the asset
only if δ = 0. The buyer accepts the seller’s offer if it is made. The other candidate price,
bρ + B, can be ruled out using Condition (1) which guarantees that if δ = 1, the seller
does not want to sell at this price. If the buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal
to S, and the seller accepts the offer only if δ = 0. Provided that Assumption (bρ+ B)−
(s + S) ≤ (1− ρ) [B− S], which is implied by Condition (1), the other candidate price,
s + S, is an inferior strategy for the buyer. The payoffs to the seller and the buyer are
vS = αS [ρ (s + S) + (1− ρ) B] + αB [sρ+ S]− cS,
vB = αS [0] + αB (1− ρ) [B− S] .
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire infor-
mation. We analyze the incentives of the seller and of the buyer in turn. Suppose that the
seller decides not to become informed. If the seller makes the offer, then the seller does
not want to sell—a strategy preferred to that of selling under Condition (2). Suppose now
that the buyer makes the offer. Then the seller does not sell. Hence the condition that the
seller becomes informed can be written as
cS ≤ αS [ρ (s + S) + (1− ρ) B− (sρ+ S)] .
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We now analyze the incentives of the buyer. Suppose that the buyer decides to become
informed. If the seller makes the offer, then the buyer still accepts the offer of the seller if
it is made, i.e. if δ = 0. Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. Then he sets a price
equal to sδ+ S, and the seller always accepts the offer. Hence the condition that the buyer
does not become informed can be written as
cB ≥ αB [ρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] + (1− ρ) [B− S]− (1− ρ) [B− S]] .
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (Only S). When the bundle is illiquid (Assumption 2), the (Only S) equilibrium
exists if and only if cS ≤ c¯S and cB ≥ c¯B.
The incentives for the seller to become informed in the (Only S) equilibrium are that if
the seller makes the offer, he can sell at a low price if δ = 0 and extract all the surplus of the
buyer. By contrast, if the seller does not become informed, he finds it best not to sell at all,
extracting less surplus and trading less. The incentives for the buyer to become informed
in the (Only S) equilibrium come from the possibility to perfectly price discriminate the
seller when the buyer makes the offer. If instead the buyer does not become informed, he
has to revert in this case to imperfect price discrimination by charging a monopoly price.
The buyer thus extracts less surplus if it does not become informed, and also trades less.
2.1.4 Only B informed equilibrium (Only B)
Equilibrium. Here we characterize the equilibrium where the buyer is informed but the
seller is not. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to b+ B, and the buyer
accepts the offer only if δ = 1. Provided that B ≤ ρ (b + B) + (1− ρ) S, which is implied
by Condition (2), the other candidate price, B, is an inferior strategy for the seller. If the
buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to s + S and buys the asset only if δ = 1.
The seller accepts the offer of the buyer if it is made. The other candidate price, sρ+ S,
can be ruled out using Condition (2), which guarantees that if δ = 0, the buyer does not
want to buy at this price. The payoffs to the seller and the buyer are
vS = αS [ρ (b + B) + (1− ρ) S] + αB [sρ+ S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)]− cB.
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire infor-
mation. The analysis is similar to that of the (Only S) case.
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Proposition 4. (Only B). When the bundle is illiquid (Assumption 2), the (Only B) equilibrium
exists if and only if cS ≥ c¯S and cB ≤ c¯B.
The incentives to become informed in the (Only B) equilibrium are the mirror image
of the corresponding incentives in the (Only S) equilibrium. We do not discuss them in
detail for brevity.
2.2 Equilibrium regions with endogenous information acquisition
It is useful to note that the incentives to acquire information are the same for both parties
in (I), (Only S) and (Only B). That is, the increase in expected payoff from becoming
informed for a party who is uninformed in equilibrium, or the loss in expected payoff
from becoming uninformed for a party who is informed in equilibrium, are the same in
equilibria (I), (Only S) and (Only B).7
We depict equilibrium regions in the
(
cS, cB
)
space. The configuration of the equilib-
rium regions is different depending on whether cB (cS) is lower or greater than c¯B (c¯S),
i.e. depending on wether the incentives to become informed in (NI) are lower than in (I),
(Only S) and (Only B) or vice versa.
(Only S) (NI) and (Only S) (NI)
(I) (NI) and (I) (NI) and (Only B)
(I) (I) (Only B)
cB
c
B
cB
cS c
S
cS
Figure 2: Equilibrium regions (the Pareto dominant equilibrium is underlined)
7Consider for example the incentives of the seller. In (I), (Only S), and (Only B), the gains from infor-
mation arise only when the seller gets to make an offer. In (I), the seller always sells the good if he gets in-
formed, but only if the good is high quality if he doesn’t. The gain from getting informed αS (1− ρ) [B− S]
is therefore the probability of making an offer αS times the probability 1− ρ that the quality of the good is
low, times the difference in surplus B− S when the good is low quality. In (Only S), the seller only sells the
good when the quality is low if he gets informed, but doesn’t sell the good if the quality is low. As a result,
the gain from getting informed αS (1− ρ) [B− S] is once again the probability of making an offer αS times
the probability 1− ρ that the quality of the good is low, times the difference in surplus B− S when the good
is low quality. Similarly, in (Only B), the seller only sells the good when the quality is high if he doesn’t
get informed, but always sells the good if he gets informed. As a result, the gain from getting informed
αS (1− ρ) [B− S] is once again the probability of making an offer αS times the probability 1− ρ that the
quality of the good is low, times the difference in surplus B− S when the good is low quality.
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It should be emphasized that the equilibrium configuration depends critically on the
distribution of bargaining power
(
αB, αS
)
. The condition for cB ≤ c¯B holds for some
distribution of bargaining power
(
αB, αS
)
if and only if
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) s ≥ 0, (5)
i.e. if the gains from trade are large enough and the dispersion of δ is low enough. Simi-
larly the condition for cS ≤ c¯S holds for some distribution of bargaining power (αB, αS) if
and only if
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) b ≥ 0. (6)
The two conditions cB ≤ c¯B and cS ≤ c¯S can simultaneously hold for some distribution of
bargaining power
(
αB, αS
)
if and only if
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S) ≥ ρ (1− ρ) b
and
bρ (1− ρ)
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) s
ρ (1− ρ) s
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) b ≤ 1. (7)
In this case, the two conditions cB ≤ c¯B and cS ≤ c¯S hold simultaneously when the
distribution of bargaining power (αB, αS) is in some non-empty convex set.
2.3 Ranking of equilibria
Note that when cB ≤ c¯B (respectively, cS ≤ c¯S), there are complementarities between the
beliefs that the buyer (respectively, the seller) is informed, and the incentives of the buyer
(respectively, the seller) to become informed—as illustrated by the comparison of the in-
centives of the buyer (respectively, the seller) to acquire information in (NI) versus (Only
B) (respectively (NI) versus (Only S)).8 These complementarities lead to the existence of
regions where multiple equilibria coexist: (NI) and either (I), (Only S) or (Only B).
The equilibria can be partially Pareto-ranked under the conditions leading to their
coexistence. The equilibrium (NI) can potentially coexist with (I), (Only S) and (Only B).
The equilibrium (I) can never coexist with (Only S) and (Only B), except in the knife-edge
case where cB = c¯B and cS = c¯S. The same is true of the equilibria (Only S) and (Only B).
8There are also complementarities between the seller’s and the buyer’s decisions to acquire
information—as illustrated by the comparison of the incentives of the buyer (resp. seller) to acquire infor-
mation in (NI) versus (Only S) (resp. (NI) versus (Only B))—although in this case, the buyer (resp. seller)
actually makes the same decision not to acquire information in both equilibria, even though his incentives
to acquire information are higher in the latter.
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The following proposition formalizes these observations.
Proposition 5. (Pareto-Ranking of Equilibria). When the bundle is illiquid (Assumption 2),
the equilibrium payoffs are ranked as follows:
vS(NI) ≥ max{vS(I), vS(Only S), vS(Only B)},
vB(NI) ≥ max{vB(I), vB(Only S), vB(Only B)}.
Therefore (NI) always Pareto dominates (I), (Only S), and (Only B) whenever they coexist.
The equilibrium with no information (NI) always dominates the equilibria with asym-
metric information (Only S) and (Only B) since it is more liquid. It also dominates the
equally liquid equilibrium with symmetric information (I) since it economizes on infor-
mation acquisition costs.
Finally, while our emphasis is on Pareto comparisons, it is useful to discuss overall
efficiency. Note first that vS + vB = bρ+ B in the (NI) equilibrium and vS + vB = bρ+ B−
cB− cS in the (I) equilibrium. In either case, the potential gains from trade ((b− s)ρ+ B−
S)) are fully realized, but it is cheaper to realize them in the (NI) equilibrium. Similarly, in
the case of the (Only S) equilibrium, vS + vB = ρ(s+ S) + (1− ρ)B− cS, which highlights
that the full gains from trade are not achieved, and still there are some costs of information
acquisition (the same consideration holds for the (Only B) equilibrium).
3 Tranching with exogenous information
Suppose that the payoff of the asset is ∆ + δ where ∆ is known, δ = 0 with probability
1− ρ and δ = 1 with probability ρ. To apply the analysis of Section 2, we define B and S
as b∆ and s∆, and so we can look at what happens when the asset is tranched into a pure
debt tranche (right to cash flow ∆) and a pure equity tranche (right to cash flow δ). To
sum up, the payoff for holding debt for the seller and the buyer are S = s∆ and B = b∆.
The payoffs to holding equity are sδ and bδ with δ ∈ {0, 1}.
The timing is as follows. First, the asset is tranched. Then, parties decide whether to
acquire information. Finally, bargaining takes place. Tranching thus has a direct effect
on trading. It also modifies the incentives to acquire information. We examine these two
effects in turn.
We first analyze the properties of tranching when information is exogenous. In our
propositions we focus for simplicity on the case where cB and cS are either 0 or ∞.
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Observe that in conformity with Modigliani-Miller, tranching is completely neutral if
information is symmetric. For any (ρ, B, b, S, s), both the debt and the equity parts are
traded with probability 1 and the game has the exact same equilibrium payoffs for all
parties.
Proposition 6. (Neutrality of Tranching with Common Information). Consider the (I) equi-
librium (cB = 0 and cS = 0) or the (NI) equilibrium (cB = ∞ and cS = ∞). Under bundling,
trade occurs with probability 1. Under tranching, trade of both the safe and the risky tranche
occurs with probability 1. Bundling and tranching are Pareto-equivalent.
When there is commonality of information, there is no illiquidity and both the insula-
tion and the trading adjuvant effects have no bite.
By contrast, tranching is not neutral when information is asymmetric and trade only
occurs with some probability. Indeed, when information is asymmetric, the effect of
tranching on liquidity is ambiguous. Tranching isolates a safe debt part that is completely
liquid (traded with probability one). Spinning off this safe tranche insulates it against the
distrust generated by the risky tranche. This tends to increase overall liquidity.
But tranching also makes the residual equity part riskier and hence less liquid. The
safe tranche no longer serves as an adjuvant in negotiations over the risk tranche. Another
way to say it is that spinning off the safe tranche lowers the cost of not trading the risky
tranche—the safe tranche no longer serves as a form of “mutual hostage”. This effect is
similar to the observation in Whinston (1990) that bundling leads to more competitive
pricing. This tends to reduce overall liquidity.
Thus the liquidity benefit of tranching is an insulation effect while the liquidity benefit
of bundling is a trading adjuvant effect. We illustrate these effects with two propositions,
starting with the insulation effect.
Proposition 7. (Insulation Effect of Tranching when the Bundle is Illiquid). When the
bundle is illiquid (Assumption 2):
i. In the (Only S) equilibrium (cB = ∞ and cS = 0), trade occurs only if δ = 0 under
bundling. Under tranching, the safe tranche is traded with probability 1 but the equity
tranche is traded only if δ = 0. Tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
ii. Consider the (Only B) equilibrium (cB = 0 and cS = ∞). Under bundling, trade occurs
only if δ = 1. Under tranching, the safe tranche is traded with probability 1 but the equity
tranche is traded only if δ = 1. Tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
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Proof. Note that under tranching, the safe tranche is always traded. The rest of the propo-
sition follows from the fact that the equivalent of Conditions (1) and (2) for the risky
tranche, namely s > bρ and sρ > 0 are implied by Conditions (1) and (2).
We continue with the trading adjuvant effect.
Proposition 8. (Trading Adjuvant Effect of Bundling when the Bundle is Liquid). When
the bundle is liquid (Assumption 2’):
i. In addition, assume that s > bρ (which is Condition (1) applied to the risky tranche, mean-
ing that the risky tranche is illiquid under (Only S)). In the (Only S) equilibrium (cB = ∞
and cS = 0), trade occurs with probability 1 under bundling. Under tranching, the safe
tranche is traded with probability 1 but the equity tranche is traded only if δ = 0. The seller
is better off under bundling than under tranching, and the buyer is worse off under bundling
than under tranching.
ii. In the (Only B) equilibrium (cB = 0 and cS = ∞), trade occurs with probability 1 under
bundling. Under tranching, the safe tranche is traded with probability 1 but the equity
tranche is traded only if δ = 1. The buyer is better off under bundling than under tranching,
and the seller is worse off under bundling than under tranching.
Proof. We treat the (Only S) equilibrium. The analysis for the (Only B) equilibrium is
similar.
Consider first the case of bundling. The trade maximizing equilibrium can be de-
scribed as follows. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to bρ+ B and
sells the asset with probability 1. The seller is better off selling at that price even if δ = 1
because bρ+ B > s+ S. If the buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to s+ S and
buys the asset with probability 1. The other candidate price, S, leads to a lower payoff for
the buyer since (1− ρ)(B− S) < (bρ+ B)− (s + S). The payoffs are
vS = αS [bρ+ B] + αB [s + S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αB [(bρ+ B)− (s + S)] .
Consider now the case of tranching. Then the safe tranche is traded with probability
1, so we focus on the risky tranche. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal
to 0 and sells the risky tranche only if δ = 0 (in which case the risky tranche is worth 0
to both the buyer and the seller). The other candidate price, bρ, can be ruled out since
s > bρ which guarantees that if δ = 1, the seller does not want to sell at this price. If the
buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to 0, and the seller accepts the offer only
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if δ = 0 (in which case the risky tranche is worth 0 to both the buyer and the seller). Since
s > bρ, the other candidate price, s, is an inferior strategy for the buyer. The payoffs are
vS = αS [sρ+ B] + αB [sρ+ S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αB [B− S] .
It is apparent that the seller is better off under bundling and that the buyer is better
off under tranching.
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 8, bundling always increases liquidity. As a re-
sult, there are more gains from trade. However, these additional gains from trade are en-
tirely captured by the informed party. This emphasizes that bundling has both a trading
adjuvant effect and also a tilting of bargaining power effect that always favors the informed
party.
Actually, while bundling makes the informed party better off, it also makes the un-
informed party worse off. Intuitively, when the uninformed party makes the offer, it
prefers to propose a very attractive offer in order to trade the asset with probability 1
under bundling, whereas under tranching it can make a less attractive offer, trade the eq-
uity tranche only with some probability but trade the debt tranche with probability 1. In
other words, under bundling, the informed party extracts some surplus even when the
uninformed party makes the offer.
4 Tranching with endogenous information acquisition
When information acquisition is endogenous, tranching modifies the incentives to ac-
quire information. This plays out differently in different cases. Indeed, starting at some
bundling equilibrium, tranching can either increase or decrease the incentives to acquire
information. Whether this information effect of tranching enhances or hinders liquidity
depends on whether parties were both informed, asymmetrically informed, or both un-
informed at the original bundling equilibrium.
4.1 Impact of tranching on information acquisition
For conciseness, we consider only the buyer’s incentives to acquire information, and fo-
cus on the case where the seller is either uninformed (cS = ∞) or informed (cS = 0). To
give tranching its best chance, we make Assumption 2 (illiquid bundle) and so the insu-
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lation effect dominates the trading adjuvant effect. Hence any eventual adverse effect of
tranching must be due to the information effect.
Recall that
c¯B = αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] ,
cB = αB (1− ρ) [sρ+ S− B] + αSρ (1− ρ) b.
As long as αB > 0, cB is decreasing in B− S and that c¯B is increasing in B− S, implying
that cB increases with tranching, and that c¯B decreases with tranching. We find it conve-
nient to indicate the dependence of these information thresholds on tranching with a (T),
for Tranching and on bundling with an (NT), for No Tranching. We have established the
following proposition.
Lemma 1. (Information Effect of Tranching). Assume that the bundle is illiquid (Assumption
2). As long as αB > 0:
i. when cS = ∞, tranching increases the incentives of the uninformed buyer to become
informed in equilibrium (NI), cB(T) > cB(NT);
ii. when cS = 0, tranching reduces the incentives of the buyer to acquire information
in equilibrium (I), c¯B(T) < c¯B(NT).
Part (i) of the Lemma shows that at the equilibrium where both parties are uninformed
(NI), tranching increases the incentives of the buyer to acquire information. This is be-
cause at the (NI) equilibrium, the benefit of becoming informed for the buyer hinges on
refusing some trades. Under bundling, refusing trades for the risky tranche comes with
the collateral damage of not trading the safe tranche. This collateral damage is absent un-
der tranching—another implication of the trading adjuvant effect of bundling which dis-
appears under tranching. Therefore, refusing trades is less costly under tranching than
under bundling. This enhances the incentives of the buyer to become informed.9
9Indeed, when the seller makes an offer (probability αS) and the buyer identifies the asset as a lemon
δ = 0 (probability 1− ρ), the latter can simply turn down the trade. This increases his payoff compared to
the case where he does not acquire information by αS(1− ρ)[bρ+ B− B]. Similarly, when the buyer makes
an offer (probability αB), and identifies the asset as a lemon δ = 0 (probability 1− ρ), the buyer can simply
not make an offer. This increases his payoff compared to the case where he does not acquire information
by αB(1− ρ)[(sρ+ S)− B]. In the first case, the gain of the buyer from becoming informed is independent
of tranching. In the second case, under tranching, the buyer’s gain from becoming informed is increased
from αB(1− ρ)[(sρ+ S)− B] to αB(1− ρ)sρ: the buyer can still purchase the safe tranche and not make an
offer on the risky tranche.
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Let us discuss Part (ii). At the equilibrium where both parties are informed (I), tranch-
ing reduces the incentives of the buyer to acquire information. This is because at the (I)
equilibrium, the benefit of becoming informed for the buyer hinges on the possibility of
making some trades. Under bundling, making trades for the risky tranche comes with the
collateral benefit of making trades for the safe tranche. This collateral benefit of bundling
disappears under tranching. Tranching therefore reduces the incentives of the buyer to
acquire information.10
Uninformed seller (cS = ∞) We start by analyzing the case where the seller is unin-
formed but the buyer can decide to acquire information. This is the case considered by
Dang et al (2011) and Yang (2011). Note also that the case analyzed by Gorton and Pen-
nacchi (1990) is a particular case where in addition cB = 0 so that the buyer is informed.
We now translate Lemma 1 into equilibrium predictions and show that, despite the
fact that making Assumption 2 stacks the deck in favor of tranching, bundling may dom-
inate tranching once information is endogeneized.
Proposition 9. (Tranching with Uninformed Seller). Assume that the bundle is illiquid (As-
sumption 2). Assume that cS = ∞, αB > 0 and cB(T) < c¯B(T) (and so from Proposition 1, we
have cB(NT) < c¯B(NT) as well). Then:
i. for cB ∈ [cB(NT), cB(T)), bundling Pareto-dominates tranching;
ii. for cB ∈ [0, cB(NT)), tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
Proof. Under both bundling and tranching, for cB < cB the only equilibrium is (Only B),
for cB ≤ cB ≤ c¯B, there are two possible equilibria (Only B) and (NI), and for c¯B < cB, the
only equilibrium is (NI). When cB ≤ cB ≤ c¯B, we select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium
(NI). Hence the equilibrium is (Only B) for cB < cB and (NI) for cB ≤ cB.
Lemma 1 shows that as long as αB > 0, we have cB(T) > cB(NT), so that (NI) is
more likely to be the equilibrium under bundling than under tranching. Indeed for cB ∈
[cB(NT), cB(T)), the equilibrium is (NI) under bundling and (Only B) under tranching.
Both parties are then better off under bundling than under tranching. This illustrates the
10Indeed when the buyer makes an offer (probability αB), and the buyer identifies that δ = 1 (probability
ρ), he can offer s+ S and get the seller to sell him the asset yielding a benefit (b+ B)− (s+ S). If the buyer is
uninformed, he prefers not to generate that trade because he fears being sold a lemon δ = 0. An uninformed
buyer offers to pay S and the informed seller accepts if δ = 0. Hence acquiring information increases the
payoff of the buyer by αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)]. Under tranching, this gain is reduced to αBρ(b− s) because
an uninformed buyer can still buy the safe tranche at price S when confronted with an informed seller who
observes δ = 1.
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adverse information effect of tranching, which reduces overall liquidity by increasing the
incentives of the buyer to acquire information.
By contrast, when cB ∈ [0, cB(NT)), then the equilibrium is (Only B) under both
tranching and bundling. Both parties are then better off under tranching. This is a mani-
festation of the benefits of the insulation effect: tranching allows to trade the safe tranche
with probability 1.
Informed seller (cS = 0) We now deal with the case where the seller is informed and
the buyer can decide whether to acquire information. Myers-Majluf (1984) and DeMarzo-
Duffie (1999) can be considered as special cases where in addition cB = ∞ so that the
buyer is uninformed.
Proposition 10. (Tranching with Informed Seller). Assume that the bundle is illiquid (As-
sumption 2), cS = 0 and αB > 0. Then:
i. for cB ∈ (c¯B(T), c¯B(NT)], the buyer is worse off and the seller is better off under bundling
than under tranching;
ii. for cB ∈ (c¯B(T), min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}], bundling increases total welfare vS + vB and
for cB ∈ (min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}, c¯B(NT)], bundling decreases total welfare vS + vB.
iii. for cB ∈ (c¯B(NT),∞), tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
Proof. Under both bundling and tranching, for cB < c¯B the only equilibrium is (I), for
c¯B < cB, the only equilibrium is (Only S).
Lemma 1 shows that as long as αB > 0, we have c¯B(T) < c¯B(NT), so that (I) is
more likely to be the equilibrium under bundling than under tranching. Indeed for cB ∈
(c¯B(T), c¯B(NT)], the equilibrium is (I) under bundling and (Only S) under tranching. Us-
ing Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we know that under tranching, we have vB(I) ≥ vB(Only
S) if and only if cB ≤ c¯B(T). Using the fact that vB(I) is the same under tranching and
bundling, we conclude that the buyer is worse off under bundling. By contrast, the
seller is obviously better off. Lemma 2 in the Appendix also shows that bundling in-
creases total welfare vS + vB for cB ∈ (c¯B(T), min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}] and decreases it for
cB ∈ (min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}, c¯B(NT)].
By contrast, when cB ∈ (c¯B(NT),∞), then the equilibrium is (Only S) under both
tranching and bundling. Both parties are then better off under tranching. This is a mani-
festation of the benefits of the insulation effect: tranching allows to trade the safe tranche
with probability 1.
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Case (i) in Proposition 9, and cases (i) and (ii) in Proposition 10 illustrate the adverse
information effect of tranching. When the seller is uninformed, tranching increases the
incentives of the buyer to acquire information. When the seller is informed, tranching de-
creases the incentives of the buyer to acquire information. In both cases, tranching works
against commonality and information and towards asymmetric information, to the detri-
ment of liquidity and welfare.
4.2 Tranching and commonality of information
We finally provide a more general argument solidifying the intuition, provided in the
introduction, that tranching encourages information acquisition when it should be de-
terred and discourages it when it should be promoted. We thereby also shed further light
on Lemma 1, and Propositions 9 and 10. The analysis relies on a simple convexity argument,
allows arbitrary tranching and does not require Assumption 2.
Suppose that the asset is split into I tranches (i = 1, ..., I); each tranche i is composed
of a fraction xi of equity (cash-flow right on δ) and of a fraction yi of debt, such that
Σixi = Σiyi = 1. The seller and the buyer bargain over the entire bundle under bundling,
and enter piecemeal negotiations for each tranche under tranching.
Proposition 11. (Tranching Works Against Commonality of Information)
i. If (NI) is an equilibrium under tranching, then (NI) is a fortiori an equilibrium under
bundling;
ii. if (I) is an equilibrium under tranching, then (I) is a fortiori an equilibrium under bundling.
Proof. We start with (i). Suppose that (NI) is an equilibrium. Let us compute the buyer’s
gain from information acquisition under tranching (GBT(NI)) and under bundling (G
B
NT(NI))
(the reasoning is symmetrical for the seller). Under tranching, when the seller makes the
offer, the seller offers price yiB+ xiρb for tranche i. The buyer’s gain from being informed
is then (1− ρ)xi(ρb), so the total gain over all tranches is Σi(1− ρ)xi(ρb) = (1− ρ)ρb, and
so is the same as under bundling. Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. When un-
informed, the buyer offers yiS + xiρs for tranche i and this offer is accepted. The buyer’s
gain on tranche i from being informed is max{ai, 0}, where
ai ≡ (1− ρ) [yiS + xiρs− yiB] .
Under bundling the gain from being informed is max{a, 0}, where
a ≡ (1− ρ) [S + ρs− B] = Σiai.
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And so,
GBT(NI) ≡ αBΣi max{ai, 0} ≥ GBNT(NI) ≡ αB max{Σiai, 0}.
We now deal with (ii). Suppose that (I) is an equilibrium and let us compute the losses
LBT(I) and L
B
NT(I) for the buyer from not being informed (again the reasoning is symmet-
rical for the seller).
With probability αS, the seller offers price B in the bad state and price B+ b in the good
state. The buyer has no surplus and therefore there is no loss from being uninformed
(besides, the offer reveals the state of nature). So suppose that the buyer makes the offer.
The loss for tranche i from not being informed is
ai ≡ (1− ρ)yi(B− S) + ρ [yi(B− S) + xi(b− s)]− yi(1− ρ)(B− S)
if yiρ(B− S) ≤ xi(s− ρb)
and
bi ≡ (1− ρ)yi(B− S) + ρ [yi(B− S) + xi(b− s)]− [yi(B− S) + xi(ρb− s)]
if yiρ(B− S) ≥ xi(s− ρb).
And so
LBT(I) ≡ αBΣi min{ai, bi} ≤ LBNT(I) ≡ αB min{Σiai,Σibi}.
While it is instructive to compute actual gains and losses (in particular, we see that
both are associated with the possibility of making an offer), the reasoning in the proof
does not hinge on the exact expressions. The key insight is that the gain from becoming
informed in a non-informed equilibrium is linked to the possibility of refusing a disad-
vantageous trade (buying a lemon, selling a high quality asset). In this respect, tranching
offers more flexibility in the trade pattern and therefore a higher gain from deviating from
the non-informed equilibrium. Similarly, the loss associated with not being informed in
an informed equilibrium is associated with the possibility of either not trading or not cap-
turing the other side’s surplus. Minimizing this loss piecewise is easier than minimizing
it globally, and so the incentive to deviate from an informed equilibrium is greater under
tranching.
Finally, we note that we have taken the view that opportunities for trade are unaf-
fected by security design: The buyer, say, can buy the same overall security under tranch-
ing and bundling. For instance, an informed buyer can under tranching acquire in several
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negotiations the various pieces of the whole bundle that he can acquire in a single negoti-
ation under bundling. In making this assumption, we implicitly follow the literatures on
market microstructure and on mechanism design. An opposite view would be that one
should cut securities in an arbitrary number of different tranches that would be traded by
different groups of agents; in such a world, it would be difficult to see how asymmetric
information would ever emerge, since the cost of acquiring information could never be
recouped through purchasing a tiny piece of the overall cake. In our view, the reason
why the formalism adopted in this section is more relevant is that there is in practice, a
second kind of information acquisition. Economic agents who trade an asset must have a
minimum amount of familiarity with the properties of this asset (as in Lester et al (2012)).
Thus, cutting into small pieces would create illiquidity rather than enhance liquidity. We
hope that future research will develop and clarify this line of thought, that seems crucial
for market microstructure and security design.
4.3 Discussion of the related literature
The security design literature is more general in some respects, and less general in some
others. Outcomes can usually take a continuum of values instead of being binary. And
optimal tranching involves mixing the safe part with as much equity as is consistent with
keeping the former liquid. On the other hand, the literature usually considers special
cases, as we do in this section (for example in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), cS = 0 and
cB = ∞). More importantly, the literature makes two key assumptions: (a) the seller has
full bargaining power (αS = 1); and (b) the seller can commit to sell some tranche and
keep the rest. Concerning this commitment assumption, note that the seller benefits from
selling the equity tranche after disposing of the safe one. Whether the seller is likely to be
able to abide to such a commitment to forego beneficial trades is context-dependent, and
we find both cases to be of interest.
Despite these differences, we can compare our results with those of the literature.
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) considers the case of an exogenously informed seller. Our
Condition (1) corresponds to their assumption that the bundle leads to wasteful under-
trade; and Proposition 7 (i) is broadly consistent with their identification of the insulation
effect.
Dang et al (2011) study the case of an uninformed seller (cS = ∞) and endogenous
information acquisition by the buyer (0 < cB < ∞). In addition, they also make Assump-
tions (a) and (b) stated above. They find that, in contrast with the analysis of this section,
tranching always optimally deters information acquisition by the buyer. The difference
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with Proposition 11 can be grasped by returning to assumptions (a) and (b). To under-
stand the role of the commitment assumption (b), suppose that αS = 1. While tranching
deters information acquisition by the buyer in Dang et al, it is neutral with respect to in-
formation acquisition in our model (when αS = 1): Recall that the buyer’s incentive to
acquire information in the (NI) equilibrium is the ability to refuse trading when δ = 0.
Regardless of how many tranches one constructs out of the bundle and of how these
tranches are structured, acquiring information allows the buyer to economize a total of ρb
when δ = 0. And so the buyer’s incentive to acquire information is independent of finan-
cial engineering. This is not so when the seller can commit not to trade (risky) tranches
as in Dang et al; the buyer’s incentive to acquire information is then reduced. To un-
derstand the role of the bargaining power assumption (a), consider now what happens
in our model when αS < 1. Tranching is no longer neutral as shown by Proposition 7
(i). Tranching enables the buyer to make a finer use of his information, i.e. to pick and
choose, and thereby encourages information acquisition.
5 Conclusion
The paper analyzed bundling with common values and endogenous information. Af-
ter pitting the insulation effect (tranching confines and liquefies the safe part) against
the trading adjuvant effect (bundling makes the risky part more liquid), the paper’s first
substantive contribution was to show that tranching always has adverse welfare effects
on information acquisition: Tranching reduces a party’s cost of not trading and there-
fore works against the commonality of information and thereby against the realization
of gains from trade. As a result, tranching encourages (discourages) information acqui-
sition when it should be deterred (encouraged). The paper provides conditions under
which tranching reduces welfare even when the insulation effect dominates the trading
adjuvant effect.
The focus of this paper leaves many alleys open to future research. In Farhi and Ti-
role (2014) we study the velocity of an asset that is repeatedly traded. We show that the
dynamic model can be nested into the static one, enabling us to make use of this paper’s
results. The central insight is that liquidity is self-fulfilling: A perception of future illiq-
uidity creates current illiquidity. Insights on velocity are shown to be closely related to
those on tranching.
One of the most challenging, but also potentially most rewarding ones is to embody
these considerations in a general equilibrium framework with a shortage of stores of
value. Endogenously varying demand for liquidity impacts the velocity of existing stores
26
of value and therefore the supply of liquidity. Another extension would look at security
design once the veil of ignorance is lifted. The issuer then would use security design
to signal underlying security values, as in Nachman and Noe (1994). A third extension
would allow for arbitrarily fine tranching options and for a larger set of information ac-
quisition strategies. On the arbitrary-tranching front, Proposition 11 demonstrates that
the key insight that tranching works against the commonality of information is robust; but
it leaves open the general characterization of optimal security design. On more general
information acquisition strategies, we have followed much of the literature in assuming
that the parties can acquire a piece of information about the value of the asset; this was
natural in our binary-state environment. Had we considered a continuum of outcomes,
say, we could have allowed, in the spirit of Yang (2011) and the rational inattention liter-
ature, parties to focus their attention on specific regions of the outcome space; the impact
of tranching on focused attention is an interesting alley for research. Yet another exten-
sion would consider regulatory attitudes toward tranching and its consequences for later
govenment attempts at restarting asset markets when bad news make the latter freeze.11
Finally, the introduction has stressed that the framework and questions apply well be-
yond the realm of security design. It clearly would be worth extending and applying the
results to policy-making in industrial organization, politics, international negotiations,
compensation design or financial regulation. We hope that these and other topics related
to this paper will be investigated in future research.
11As in, e.g., Camarzo et al (2013), Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012).
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Appendix: Lemma for Section 4
In Section 4, we make use of some comparison of payoffs across equilibria even when
they might not coexist. For example, we establish that vS(I) > vS(Only B) when cS < c¯S
and vS(I) < vS(Only B) when cS > c¯S. As long as cB < cB, the equilibrium is (I) or (Only
B). It is (I) when vS(I) > vS(Only B) and (Only B) when vS(I) < vS(Only B).
Lemma 2. (Further Comparison of Payoffs). The payoffs are ranked as follows:
i. for the seller: vS(NI) ≥ vS(I) ≥ vS(Only S), and vS(NI) ≥ vS(Only B); furthermore
vS(I) ≥ vS(Only B) if and only if cS ≤ c¯S;
ii. for the buyer: vB(NI) ≥ vB(I) ≥ vB(Only B), and vB(NI) ≥ vB(Only S); furthermore
vB(I) ≥ vB(Only S) if and only if cB ≤ c¯B.
iii. for total welfare v = vS + vB: v(NI) ≥ max{v(I), v(Only S), v(Only B)}; furthermore
v(I) ≥ v(Only B) if and only if cS ≤ c¯S
αS
, and v(I) ≥ v(Only S) if and only if cB ≤ c¯B
αB
.
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